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INTRODUCTION
The modern theory of the neutrality of money can be thought of as an 
extension of the work of Phelps (1967, 1970) and Friedman (1968) who 
began to question the validity of the Phillips curve in the longrun. 
Because economic agents learn about the economy and adapt their 
expectations fully in the long-run,, government cannot reduce the long 
run level of unemployment or rendering stabilisation policy ineffective.
The New Classical Macroeconomics School has taken Phelps and Friedman's 
ideas, further demonstrating the ineffectivenss of anticipated monetary 
policy of Keynesian type stabilisation policy in effecting real changes 
in the economy, even in the short-run.
We wish to argue that stabilization policy in a developing economy is - 
effective in the shortrun..„We-wish-to_argue within the Rational 
Expectations'methodology, showing the effectiveness of stabilization 
policy in a developing economy contrary to the propositions of the 
school.
The Neutrality of Stabilisation Policy Proposition
It is on the basis of the Phelps-Lucas island economy that typical Lucas 
supply function of goods is constructed. T h g .  L .U C O S  ST\od(ti is  O S
7 t = a + bt ( i )
=  A  ( P± ~  +  £ *  f2>
I t  =  X* - P l <3)
= +  U ±  (4 -)where Yt is the log of the secular component reflecting capital 
accumulation and population changes*t is time, YCt is the cyclical 
component, *-^ e expected price formed at time t - 1, Pt
is the price at time t, Et is the supply shock, Xt is log of nominal 
GNP and Ut is a demand shock.
Eq. (3) is a demand function and Equation (4) is a policy rule. The 
supply function is therefore, by combining (1) and (2)
YtS = Yt + B(Pt - E(Pt/Ifl)) + Et (5)
where E(Pt/It-l) is the mathematical expectation of the current price 
conditional (I-t-i) past information about the market.
Equating (3) and (5) and subsequent substitutions the equilibrium 
output (Yt) is,
Yt = Yt + + (1" T> } Et (6)
where = B/ (1 + B) .
On the basis of Equation (6) the New Classical School Concludes that 
stabilisation policy is ineffective because output is independent of 
government policy.
THE EFFECTIVENESS ON STABILISATION POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
The New Classical macroeconomics school, has only succeded in showing 
the ineffectiveness of the stabilisation policy, on the basis of the 
stochastic character of the models used. A developing economy has 
an undeveloped domestic market structure which is affected by external 
economic conditions. The demand shocks in such an economy tend to be 
multiplicative and not additive as the school suggests.
Following Snower (1981) we can transform the policy rule to reveal the 
multiplicative character of demand disturbances.
Then,
Xt = A x ^  Ut (7)
and
where E(U ) * 1 and Var CUt) =du^ (Constant).
Substituting (7) in (3), and equating with (5), the resultant equilibrium 
output (Y11) is,
xt = Yt + /\ (U-i) Xt_1 + ( 1 - r p  Et (9)
From (9) it is clear that output is now dependent on the systematic 
component of the policy rule, thus making stabilization policy effective.
The effectiveness of stabilization policy could be demonstrated when 
the policy rule has a feedback characteristic. This implies a non-zero 
long-run expected rate of monetary growth. Money supply is the sum of 
domestic credit and foreign reserves. The affinity for borrowing 
external funds or aid by developing economies results [n the swelling
- 2 -
E(X/ I J t - 1. (8)
- 3 - '
•of foreign reserves, and hence a non-zero longrun growth of money 
supply. Domestic credit tends to be uncontrolled for most of the 
developing economies, further swelling money supply.
The feedback policy rule could be of the form,
Xt = A x t_1 + 'tut_1 , (10)
where Tf is a policy parameter which increases the variance of the 
disturbance term ut_i. Substituting (10) into (3) and equating with 
(5) we solve for equilibrium output,
Yt = Yt + T j T  + (1 -T |) Et • (11)
The policy parameter Is consequential on the probability distribution 
of output.
In the rational expectations models the assumption that prices are 
fully flexible Is Imposed on each island in the economy. This Is one 
of the key assumptions which leads to the Ineffectiveness of 
stabilization policy on real output, employment and other real 
variables.
In most developing economies prices, tend to'be sticky because of 
price control by government.
Minimum wage policies make wages sticky downwards white price control 
on goods makes prices Sticky upwards.
Sticky prices have the characteristic of making stabilization policy, 
effective because we get standard Keynesian "multiplier" results 
in the short period while prices are fixed.
Consider a developing economy where government fixes prices at the 
end of period t to cover periods t + 1, t + 2. At the end of 
period t + 2 prices are fixed for the periods t + 3 and t + 4, and 
so on. This means prices cannot be altered during the period 
,t + 1, t + 2, t + 3, and so on.
Since the firms' behaviour is limited then government stabilization 
policy could be effective because the government is free to act to 
remove the disequilibrium to which price stickiness can lead.
-li-
We could also argue that price partial flexibility follows a 
partial adjustment mechanism such that,
Pt " Pt-1 = (E^t^t-l5 ^ t - l 5 * (12)
Taking expectations and solving for E(Pt/It 
we obtain,
E(pt/It-i) " Pt /(l -0<l) - * 1 Pt-l/ (1 -0U) <13>
Substituting (13) into (5) and solving for equilibrium output (Yt) 
we obtain,
Yt - u + r y )  Yt -7|pt_i+Tyct . + a-rj) Et <u>
Therefore equilibrium output is determined by the policy rule making 
stabilization policy effective.
The ineffectiveness of stabilization policy also relies on the 
government and private sector possessing the same information about 
the economy.
In a developing economy information is scarce and markets are undeveloped, 
making government policy not easily predictable by the private sector.
In the face of this assymmetric information, where government has 
superior information, stabilization policy could be effective.
If government has superior information, then it possesses a set of
information, It, which includes Xt, in equations, (3) hnd (/).),
Then the policy rule becomes
Xt=AXt + Ut, (15)
and then,
Xt = Ut/(1-A)
5With this policy rule equilibrium output is,
Yt = Yt + T | Dt M i  - . ^  ) + ( i  - r y  Et (17)
Equilibrium output is determined by exogenous supply and demand 
shocks and also government policy parameter, • This implies,
that there is a definite trade off between output and inflation 
resulting in effective stabilization policy.
Conclusion
The implications of the New Classical School proposition transcend 
the mere neutrality of monetary policy and deny any Keynesian 
type of stabilisation policy credibility. However the ineffectiveness 
of stabilization policy is true to the extent that it is imposed 
upon the aggregate models by the propositions.
The nature of. markets in developing economies renders Keynesian 
type stabilisation effective. In developing countries demand shocks 
are thought to be multiplicative rather than additive, prices are 
inflexible, information between government and the private sector is 
assymetric, and uncontrolledCTSdit expansion, ensure the effectiveness 
of stabilisation policy in the shortrun.
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